您目前所在的位置:首页 - 期刊简介 - 详细页面

铁道科学与工程学报

JOURNAL OF RAILWAY SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING

第9卷    第3期    总第47期    2012年6月

[PDF全文下载]    [Flash在线阅读]

    

文章编号:1672-7029( 2012) 03-0088-05
建筑招投标价格博弈与市场均衡
张镇森,王孟钧,陆洋,刘慧

(中南大学土木工程学院,湖南长沙410075)

摘 要: 建筑市场价格扭曲带来了一系列质量和安全问题,严重制约建筑市场的健康发展。为解决这一问题,应首先对建筑招投标价格的博弈模型进行分析。运用博弈论原理,构建建筑招投标过程中业主与承包商不完全信息动态非合作的双价二手车交易博弈模型。探讨业主与承包商就建筑产品价格所展开的博弈过程以及最终的市场均衡成交价格。将建筑招投标的价格均衡划分为市场完全成功、市场完全失败和市场部分成功,分别讨论3 种市场类型存在的条件。对建筑招投标价格博弈模型及市场均衡的分析,有助于市场管理者运用经济激励手段调控市场,保障市场的健康发展。

 

关键字: 建筑市场; 招投标价格; 双价二手车模型; 不完全信息动态博弈; 动态贝叶斯均衡

Bidding price game and market equilibrium of construction products
ZHANG Zhen-sen,WANG Meng-jun,LU Yang,LIU Hui

Schol of Civil Engineering,Central South University,Changsha 410075,China

Abstract:Price distortion seriously hinders the healthy development of the construction market.The construction bidding price game model was studied to solve this problem.The game theory was used to set up a double price used car model between the owner and the contractor which belongs to incomplete information dynamic non-cooperative game.The game process and the equilibrium price were analyzed on the price game between owners and contractors.The construction market was divided into three kinds,i.e.the completely successful market,the completely unsuccessful market and the partial successful market,and the existence conditions were discussed.It will be useful for the market regulator to use economic incentive means to control the market,and to safeguard the healthy development of the market.

 

Key words: construction market; bidding price; double price used car model; incomplete information dynamic game; dynamic Bayesian equilibrium

ISSN 1672-7029
CN 43-1423/U

主管:中华人民共和国教育部 主办:中南大学 中国铁道学会 承办:中南大学
湘ICP备09001153号 版权所有:《铁道科学与工程学报》编辑部
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
地 址:湖南省长沙市韶山南路22号 邮编:410075
电 话:0731-82655133,82656174   传真:0731-82655133   电子邮箱:jrse@mail.csu.edu.cn